نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
This article explores how meaning and order are attributed to the world through values and ends. Values provide significance and impose order, particularly through moral and practical norms that define “what ought to be.” Modern approaches, however, have shifted this inquiry to a descriptive scientific perspective, analyzing how order emerges. A key challenge in studying ideal order scientifically is its unfulfilled nature, making it seem unsuitable for empirical analysis. The article examines Friedrich von Hayek’s solutions to this issue, influenced by Neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert. Hayek, adopting an agnostic epistemology, denied direct knowledge of reality and emphasized rational reconstruction over mere observation. Within this framework, social order is not given but must be reconstructed by the subject to be scientifically studied. The article questions the premises in Hayek’s thought that justify this reconstructive approach and make it non-arbitrary.
Influenced by the Neo-Kantians, Hayek views the world as lacking inherent rational qualities and emphasizes the need for self-awareness regarding the limitations of the human mind. For him, the totality of reality is infinite, and given the limitations of human reason, access to it is impossible. Based on this premise, he concludes that knowledge is possible only through abstraction or concept formation. In Hayek’s view, the manner of abstraction or conceptual formation shapes our understanding of the world. In this sense, abstraction or conceptual formation is an epistemological necessity that enables knowledge. Accordingly, the “validity” of abstraction (or conceptual formation as an epistemological necessity facilitating scientific knowledge) does not stem from external, actual reality, but from the way reality is understood and conceptually constructed. This article argues that the claim of necessity in scientific knowledge, according to Rickert, is conditioned by the primacy of practical reason, and in Hayek’s thought by the primacy of the abstract. In other words, epistemological necessity is conditioned by a normative necessity. A point of convergence between Hayek and Rickert is their normative view on the source of validity. For Rickert, the theoretical values of practical reason are the source of validity; for Hayek, abstract rules serve this function. According to this view, a normative concept such as the ideal order assumes a Janus-faced character: on the one hand, it is a goal to be realized, and on the other, it is an entity that can be the object of descriptive study.
This article, while elucidating the logical precedence of “the normative” over the description or scientific study of the ideal order in Hayek’s views and those of his intellectual predecessors, clarifies the boundaries of the scientific study of concepts such as ideal order and open society. For Hayek, the limitations of human reason form the basis of his argument for the primacy of action and the legitimacy of individual freedom within spontaneous orders. The limitations of the human mind and its incurable ignorance define the framework for the scientific study of the open society. He believes that acknowledging ignorance is essential to understanding society. Hayek asserts that a “civilized” individual may indeed be more ignorant-perhaps even more so than some “savages”-and yet still benefit greatly from the civilization in which they live. Thus, human limitations in knowledge are closely connected to individual freedom. Any claim to absolute knowledge inherently restricts human freedom. The freedom Hayek advocates is negative, or non-substantive, characterized by its relational, formal nature.
This article emphasizes that Hayek’s concept of spontaneous order is based on formal, negative, and abstract rules, rather than on positive goals. This spontaneous order comprises a set of “what should not be done” principles that are revealed through an evolutionary process. Its rules are historically contingent, yet not entirely bound by past events, but rather by an evolutionary history. For Hayek, an advanced society can no longer rely on common goals, as reality lacks any intrinsic end and cannot be a source of values or norms. In a complex society organized by the division of labor, consensus on shared goals becomes unattainable. Therefore, impersonal order, based on universal and general laws applicable to all, is the only feasible method for organizing an advanced society. This impersonal, spontaneous order, which emerges through an evolutionary process, depends on something beyond intelligent design and planning. However, the self-regulating social-economic order that Hayek presents as the product of evolutionary processes is ultimately a form of “functional illusion” with epistemological and ideological significance. Spontaneous order is a utopia that is never meant to be realized, just as key concepts like “equilibrium” and “evolution” do not reflect empirical objective reality. Nonetheless, in Hayek’s thought, these concepts become reified; hence, critique should not be limited to merely contrasting them with empirical realities but should address the reification of such concepts. As Adorno and Horkheimer assert in Dialectic of Enlightenment, “all reification is a forgetting.” Illuminating the regulative, normative, non-empirical, and hypothetical nature of such fundamental concepts in social sciences is thus a form of critical action.
کلیدواژهها English
