عنوان مقاله [English]
Theorizing about media, under the influence of prevailing view in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, has been done mostly within a representational framework. Representationalism, however, beside its usual problems, faces a new one in the context of visual media use. In representational approach, the experience of visual media use is something exceptional and separate from everyday experiences. But by adopting an anti-representational view, like extended mind theory, no such problem arises. The basic claim of extended mind theory is that cognitive processes are not confined to our brain and body, but extend to the surrounding environment. We show that this thesis looks much more plausible in the context of visual media use, compared to representationalist approaches, and also that it may be possible to rejoin one of the objections made to the extended mind theory, namely the fallacy of coupling-constitution by pointing to media use experience. Explanatory strength of anti-representationalist approach may be one the reasons why some prominent media theorists like Hugo Münsterberg and Marshall McLuhan, long before Clark and Chalmers, had ideas about mind extension in the media theories.